We present a method for tendering and contracting a project consisting of multiple interdependent tasks, that will ensure that the parties are interested in the behavior that is optimal for the whole system. Still the method enables the participants to change the conditions of their contracts during the process. We also show how can this be applied when only partial information is available about the values of different outcomes. The presented method does not replace, but extends the current ways of tendering.
Introduction
When we want to get some different parts of a job (such as the construction, monitoring or planning of some system) done by multiple parties, we contract them. It is very important how we do this, as after the contracts are set, each party only tries to get the maximum profit subject to his contract, independently of our interest. Generally the tasks can depend on each other, that is, our job does not resolve to independent subtasks. For example there may be some precedence between them, and therefore the value of the whole job cannot be expressed by the sum of the values of the tasks. Moreover, the participants should be chosen using tendering, in order to get the lowest prices. Of course we suppose that there is no total monopoly in any task, otherwise the tendering has no sense. Thus, our goal is to post and evaluate the tenders in such a way, that we get the maximum profit in the end. For this we should somehow decide the values of the different outcomes. The outcome means the complete endstate here, which is everything connected to the result of the process, such as completion time, the quality, guarantee conditions, or even noise pollution. Let us assume that an objective function is given for this purpose. Later we will discuss the other assumptions we can use instead.
In this article we will present a method that, applied to the announcement and evaluation of the submissions, enables us to pick the contracts that maximize the expected profit. Moreover, the profit will be fixed. During the whole process, the agents, and in fact any group of them will be interested in telling the truth. This method also allows the parties at any time to change the terms of their contract in an automated way, without disadvantage for anyone concerned.
The essence of the method is that we do not make any restrictions on the form of the submissions, and accept the set that guarantees us the largest profit. We leave the possibility open for the applicants to decide the conditions they offer, including all which are used nowadays. This way all agents will have an interest in submitting in accordance with his own real workflow (this is defined under), and its interest will always be the same as the global interest of the system.
The main goal Definition 1
The profit of the system is the difference of the total revenue and expenses of the parties. Similarly we will talk about the interest of the system in the meaning of the interest corresponding to its expected profit.
Since the amount of the profit requested by applicants for different tasks depends on the task and the competition, thus the profits to be paid are essentially independent of the tendering system. Therefore our profit is maximal if and only if the profit of the system is.
Our goal is to make agreements with every party in such a way, that if at every decision everybody behaves in favour of his own interest according to the agreement, then this behavior is advantageous to the whole system. That is, everybody aims for the maximum profit of the system. This means that if for us there is a difference between the values of two different states, then there has to be the same difference for the liable party. It is not enough to require only that this state should be more valuable for him. Because for example if for some x > y > z this state is more valuable for the system by x and for him by z, and y is the cost to get to the more valuable state (or py is the cost to get p more chance for it), then while it would be better for the system, he will not pay for this. On the other hand, if this requirement is satisfied, then the good decision will always be as important for everybody as it is for the system.
For this it is necessary that every applicant provides his real expenses in the application. Of course, determining these precisely is almost impossible, but in fact this is not what we need. What we really need is that the applicants put as much effort (spend as much money) in learning and disclosing their own workflow, as its worth for the system. That is, if an applicant submits a less precise application and by this the system works with some errors, then the loss caused falls entirely on him, and has no effect on anybody else.
The workflow
We will use the terms of requirement, fulfillment and outcome where there is a fulfillment assigned to every requirement.
Definition 2 For each applicant we define his workflow: as a rooted binary branching tree structure consisting of the following terms:
The nodes of the tree are of three kinds: This means the following: the different courses of the workflow are the paths from the root to a leaf. As the result of such a path, the outcome of the leaf is achieved at its time for the total cost of the edges of the path. During the progress of the path, the appropriate fulfillments are fulfilled and requirements have to be satisfied in the given times.
A contingency point describes some random event, such as an error, failure of equipment, weather conditions, illness or simply faster or slower progress in the work. A decision point is a point in the process at which some kind of decision can be made, for example choice of faster or cheaper shipment, number of employees, etc.
Requirements and fulfillments describe the mandatory connections between the different parts of the process. In a decision point the branch with a requirement can only be chosen if the appropriate fulfillment has been carried out earlier by some other applicant. This is called precondition. For example if some task has to be preceded by another one, then we assign fulfillments to the leaves of the preceding task, and the subsequent task starts with a decision point. On one branch, the appropriate requirement has to be satisfied before the work could start, on the other one you arrive to a similar decision point a bit later. In a similar manner we can describe that it would be better to get information earlier about the possible starting time of the latter task. So in his model it is possible to influence the working process through the decision points; we can get feedback on the progress through the contingency points, and we also have some knowledge about the chances of the different feedbacks. Here the probabilities in the contingency points are independent, but to some extent this can be eliminated by introducing some fictive agent. The binary structure of the tree is only assumed for the sake of simplicity, as any branching can be described by two-way branchings.
The submission
The submission is defined based on the workflow as follows: to the contingency points, instead of probabilities, each applicant assignes functions f : R → R. These declare that for any x of which he is informed not later than the time of the point, for an f (x) amount he agrees to pay x in a given case. By such submission the applicant agrees to inform us of the result at the contingency points, and to proceed at the decision points according to the requests of the system. At the end, he delivers the state corresponding to the leaf in time, similarly he fulfills the appropriate fulfillments, and for this he receives the sum of the expenses of the works on the traversed path plus the differences determined at the contingency points.
This submission can be viewed as a translation of the simplified, approximate workflow (with the expense increased by the desired profit, which as usually is bound by the competing market). The probabilities of a contingency point are translated as follows: If the probability of one case is p and 1 − p for the other, then you agree for f (x) = px, meaning that you pay (1 − p)x with probability p and get px with probability 1 − p, that is your expected revenue is 0. This translated submission is called the prime cost submission, and with some increased constant cost -the desired expected profit -is called a fair submission.
Of course, it could happen that it is not as good to gain a lot of money as bad it is to loose the same amount, if putting up this money needs extra efforts. This phenomenon is called value concavity (the value of money is a concave function). This is why it could be reasonable to provide some other, convex functions. If the chances are over-or underestimated, then this could also lower the arising loss, as we will see later.
We note that we may assume f (0) = 0. Furthermore, in every rational submission 0 ≤ f ′ (x) ≤ 1. There are two submissions and their combined submission in this figure. The work consists of two tasks; these are the submissions for them. If both parts are completed in time, the income is 40. The first task is either started at the beginning with a cost of 5 and probability of the success of 1/2, or they make preparations for the cost of 1, and later if we want they can try to complete the task for the cost of 7 with probability 1/2. The cost of the other is 5 and the probability of the success is 1/2. All of this happens in the order as in the figure.
At the bottom 1 denotes the success and 0 the failure. The solid square is a decision point, the other type of node is a contingency point with 1/2 probability, meaning that they would get x amount of money in case of success and pay x otherwise for any value of x asked. We determine x as half of the difference between the values of the two results. Thus, for the combined submission, the values of the states (denoted in italics) can be computed from bottom to top. For the second applicant this means that he will get 6.5 besides his expenses if he succeeds (that is 11.5 in total), but we will deduct 6.5 from his payment (that is he should pay 1.5) in the case he fails. Also we can see, surprisingly a bit, that in the first decision point of the first applicant we should choose the second branch.
The evaluation
Consider first the case, when for every task we have to accept exactly one submission at the beginning of the project. Then by taking one submission per task in every possible way and evaluating these combinations, we should choose the best combination. We handle the submissions in a combined submission that describes the aggregate process. Each state of this is the collection of the states of the single submissions. Hence we construct it by following the submissions, and creating an appropriate branching if it occurs in one of them, and then continue on both branches. During this we do not consider those branches for which the appropriate requirements have not been satisfied yet. So there are no preconditions in the combined submission, as they have already been considered. We get the endstates as the combination of the appropriate endstates.
The value of a state means how much profit will we get starting at this state. On a branchless interval of the work, obviously it grows only by the cost of the work. The values of the endstates are defined by the objective function. If the values after a decision point are given, the value before the decision point is their maximum, as we will clearly choose the more favorable option. Now consider the contingency point. If the value of one case is a, other's is b and the function given by the applicant is f (meaning that he asks f (x) for paying x in the first case), then the value of the state before the contingency point is b − f (b − a), because if we accept his offer with x = b − a we get this profit in both cases. Using these computations we can calculate the profit of every state, including the starting point, which we will call our profit. We can achieve this using the decisions described above.
For the applicants this means that we inform them about our choices at the decision points, and which x parameters do we choose for the f functions in the contingency points.
The choice of a submission for a task does not necessarily happen this way. It may happen that we can give the answer to some of the applicants later, perhaps for a standby fee. Or some submissions could be suitable as a reserve; if the chosen party fails, then with an increased cost, but he can do the task faster. For a controlling task, we can accept more than one application, etc. With some extra work all these cases can be handled. For this we have to put decision points denoting the acceptance before the applications, provided with appropriate preconditions which exclude each other. If for example if we can accept any number of submissions for a particular task, then there is nothing to do. But if only one can be accepted, then the precondition of the acceptance should be the rejection of the others. After this, we can handle all submissions for a task in the combined submission simultaneously.
6 The optimality of and the interest in the fair behavior Definition 3 Consider our maximum profit in the cases when we must and must not accept a submission. The difference between them is called the value of the submission.
That means how much lower the submission's cost is than it is required for its acceptance. That is why submissions with the same chance for acceptance will have about the same value. For example, fixing the submissions for all works except one gives preference values for all possible submissions for this work, for which the value of a submission is the difference between the preferences of this and the best of all other submissions.
Let us assume that every submission is fair. Then the combined submission is the translation of the combined workflow -defined similarly -, plus the constant profits. Consider the state when we have accepted or rejected all submissions and have paid the requested profits. From here, every submission is a prime cost submission, hence they have no interest in the decisions we make. Thus the interest of the system is the same as ours, so for this combination of workflows the decisions prescribed by the rules of the evaluation are optimal according to the interest of the system.
Assume that one applicant gives a submission that is not fair, and which we accept, that is its value is positive. Compare this to the case when he applies with his fair submission of the same value (so having equal chances of acceptance). The expected profits of the other applicants are fixed, so they are uninterested in what happens beyond them. The two cases are the same for us too, as our profit is the profit without this submission plus its value, which is equal in the two cases. Hence, by exclusion, the loss the system suffers will damage this applicant.
This also means that if the description of the workflow has substantial costs for some applicant, then it is worthwhile to pay for it exactly as long as it is in the interest of the system. This alone would not exclude that several parties could conspire to circumvent the system. If applicants for one task join to get higher price, that is a problem of trust, which clearly cannot be handled by such methods. But, on the other hand, if applicants for different tasks join together, then the theorem applies to them as a whole. Thus they cannot jointly benefit from this, so there is no such incentive to join. And this is true for the case of the controlling and the controlled parties too.
We will discuss later what happens if everybody gives a somewhat imprecise submission.
Modification during the process
Assume that someone can refine his workflow during the process. It would be in the interest of the system to allow him to carry out such modifications. The question is: on what conditions?
The answer is that we could regard the modification as a contingency point of 0 probability in the original submission. This is possible, as such contingency points do not alter the value of the submission. From another aspect this means that we allow any modifications for the value difference between the original and the new submissions. As it is shown above, this is in his interest, and his interest in the modifications is exactly the same as the system's interest in them.
It may happen that in the beginning it is too costly for some applicant to explore the many improbable branches of his workflow, especially if he does not yet know whether his application will be accepted. Later however, it would worth to explore the ones that became probable. It is exactly this kind of in-process modifications that we would like to make possible. And in fact for the applicants, it is worth to do this in the same schedule as the interest of the system would require, as we will see below.
Since the expected profit of an applicant who submits a fair submission is independent of the course of the other submissions, for a submission that is nearly fair, the small modifications of the other submissions have little effect.
Hence as the modifications of one applicant have no influence on our profit and only little influence on the profit of other applicants, the change in the system's profit is essentially the change of his expected profit. This confirms the above statement.
On the other hand, it is clear that if the objective function is somewhat modified, then everything can be rescheduled according to the new goals. Of course the job should remain essentially the same.
Participants with limited funds
Consider a task that could cause great damage when done poorly. What shall we do with an application of a company that has not enough funds to cover the damage? In such case one must not place the whole responsibility on it. Otherwise every big company would create a small spin-off company to apply with it and moderate the loss in case of failure. But even if we could exclude this, we should not accept such an application, because they would treat the danger less seriously. We definitely need someone who could take the whole responsibility.
Yet, it may happen that it is known that the applicant is reliable to some degree. But who knows this? If he has little funds, he can say anything without responsibility, therefore we should not take it into account. (Having funds can also mean that someone who has funds, even the tenderer himself, takes the responsibility for our decisions. Advisory boards are usual examples.) But someone who has enough funds could offer to take the responsibility for an appropriate fee, maybe after made a suitable agreement with the applicant about the way of controlling, etc. In effect this is a kind of insurance party. By this we get a submission which has this additional insurance fee, but we can be sure that the possible damage could be compensated. Nowadays this risk is usually taken by the tenderer. This is also possible here; he could fill the controlling or the insuring part. But in this function we consider him a distinct party.
There are some other ways to get such applicants involved in the job, but we consider their work to require control. So we make a contract in which they only take some small x ratio of the liability, and besides this we contract another party for controlling. Besides a fixed fee, they get the ratio of x of the loss an error would have caused if they discover and correct it, but have to pay its 1 − x ratio if they leave an error uncorrected. This way if they are able to correct an error with probability 1 − x, they could not come off badly, no matter how many errors the first party makes. And all this could be done on more levels, and the parameter x need not to be fixed in the tender announcement. We could ask for submissions with these parameters free. Of course this does not exclude any kind of negotiations used in practice. The presented method fits perfectly to our tendering system.
Of course one can not be sure that a company could pay the accidental damage, unless it puts an appropriate amount in deposit, which could not be expected. For this we can use -combined arbitrarily with the previous methods -the conventional risk management, which again means taking on the already mentioned insurance role.
Thus, we should make such a contract that, if we want to get some x amount, they agree to pay f (x), from which expectingly x would be actually paid. Clearly, when x is the expected worth of the company, f (x) is infinite, therefore we do not accept proposals above that value. Considering the value concavity, f could be even bigger. Of course determining f also involves responsibility, and can be handled by the method, but we omit the details.
Notes and explications
The real submissions need not be presented in this form at all. As a computer have some elemental operations, which the user should not even know about, similarly this submission form is only a low-level language and a higher level language should be built on it.
Let's investigate the extent of the error caused by the inaccuracy in a submission. As any two submissions can be easily extended to have identical tree structures, the inaccuracies could be considered as the errors in the other parameters. Then in the combined submission only the parameters will be wrong. If the inaccuracy is close to 0, then the number and the measure of the wrong decisions are proportional to it, thus the expectation of the caused loss is only proportional to the square of it.
Functions assigned to the contingency points can formally be avoided. The applicant can replace such function by introducing decision point(s) for determining x directly before the contingency points. After it the two cases of the contingency are as follows, either the first one happens and f (x) amount of expenses arise, or the second one happens and x−f (x) is paid back. But either can happen without any further responsibility. This also shows that (if necessary) an earlier deadline could be asked for determining x, but this is not recommended.
Preconditions can also be avoided by extending the objective function with the value of −∞ where a precondition does not satisfy.
Assigning costs to works can be avoided, too, by requesting the sum of the costs among each path in the outcome of the appropriate endpoint.
Besides the value concavity there is another reason for the functions to be convex. For example, theoretically it may happen that an applicant estimates the probability of an unfavorable event in 10%, but another one knows that the chance is 15%. It may occur that the second applicant has to proceed on two different decision branches in the two cases, and he knows exactly which two. Then he can increase the expenses of the less probable case by 10x and decrease the costs by x. That is, he bets 1:9 with the other applicant on an event of 15% probability. Because of this danger, the first applicant could rightfully say that the larger bet can only be increased on worse conditions. The effects of this problem are fortunately weakened by the value concavity.
In the objective function only the requirements could be stated precisely, but it is usually hard to say how much loss is caused by a non-exact outcome. So for example, if we can only prove a given p ratio of someone's mistakes, then we can make a contract by which he should pay 1/p times the proven loss. Establishing an error can happen by the presently used system, that is, if we notice an error, a claim is stated for its determined value. The other party either accepts this claim, or the amount of loss is established by court, and legal expenses are payed by the loser.
When we talk about prime cost we mean how much one could get from the money put into work by investing it instead of contracting for this task. There are plenty of possibilities of getting profit from capital, which gives a rate of growth above which it is worth to invest, and below which it is not. So the prime cost corresponds to this rate of growth. Thus the extra profit above this is not significant, it only has to cover the company's other expenses, not the natural growth.
We have not deal with the timing of the payments. The change of money's value can be easily handled. Otherwise if it is not indifferent when to pay, then it could be included in the objective, which solves the problem.
We have supposed the independence of the chances of the contingencies in the model. But for events independent of the applicants -e.g. weather or the changes of the prime rate -this may not be the case. We can handle this by introducing a fictive agent whose submission consists of a multiple contingency that describes the distribution of the outcomes, and there are fulfillments in the leaves. In the submissions we replace the appropriate contingency points by decisions with proper requirement on the branches. The responsibility for the agent introduced this way can be taken by any party, for example the tenderer after estimating the chances. The responsibility can even be shared between multiple parties.
If we divide the project into tasks and we accept one submission per task, then this method can be combined with 2nd price auction.
Future improvements and research
A deficiency of the method is that, because of the large number of arising branches, the evaluation presented in the article is infeasible in practice. Actually it should be considered more as a definition than a practical algorithm. For the general case, when the structure of the trees are arbitrary, efficient algorithms are not expected.
An actual submission could contain even infinitely many branches, but it sould have some compact representation, as it necessarily has some transparent structure. Because of this we can expect at least good approximating algorithms for this problem. Moreover, it is possible that we can specify some conditions on the structure of the submissions, which are usually satisfied, and by which efficient algorithms could be created. This should be probably the main area of further research. The above mentioned higher-level language of the submissions have to be made. For this the already existent tendering systems should be written in this language, as the goal is that creating a submission have to be as easy as possible. For example it is enough to give a description of a conventional workflow only once, which describes that, with the progress of the work, one can make more precise estimate for the completion time, and possibly the work can be urged for extra expences. After this an applicant only have to fill some parameters, which completes the time-related part of his application.
Companies in many fields prefer not to use objective functions that assign values to the endstates, as there are too many subjective aspects in it. Thus other methods are used for evaluations. It is worth investigating if these methods could be made compatible with ours.
